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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between monitoring mechanisms 
namely, board and audit committee effectiveness, foreign and domestic institutional ownership 
and competition with voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital (IC) among listed banks in the 
Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) region. The content analysis was used to analyse IC 
disclosures of 137 listed GCC banks. A regression model is utilized to analyze the data. The 
results suggest that the monitoring mechanisms have significant relationship with the quantity of 
IC information disclosed. The findings contribute to support agency theory by indicating that 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate voluntary disclosure can be used strategically 
by considering the mechanisms as a bundle since they work complimentary to reduce agency 
conflicts. In addition, the finding also suggests that foreign institutional ownership have more 
monitoring capacities than domestic institutional investors in relation to IC disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Studies to examine the association of voluntary disclosure and corporate governance 
mechanisms have been done extensively in different countries for various sectors (e.g. Alfraih & 
Almutaw, 2017; Jaffar, et al. 2013; Saha & Akter, 2013). The current study focuses on a 
particular type of voluntary disclosure, which is intellectual capital (IC) disclosure since it is an 
important dimension of voluntary disclosure for which there is a growing demand (Holland, 
2003, Burgman & Roos, 2007). IC is the key driver of the company’s competitive advantage, 
and disclosing it reduces investors’ uncertainty about future prospects and facilitates a more 
precise valuation of the company (Barth et al., 2001; Bukh et al., 2005; Holland, 2006; Li et al., 
2012). Despite the importance of IC disclosure, the company is disclosing it voluntarily (Petty & 
Cuganesan, 2005; Zhang, 2001). IC is specific to a particular company and cannot be seen from 
other companies. Smaller shareholders are at disadvantages if the information about IC is not 
disclosed because they do not have access to the information. Thus, corporate governance 
mechanisms are more critical for IC than other types of disclosure inasmuch as it involves 
information asymmetry more (Aboody & Lev, 2000; Hidalgo et al. 2010). Agency cost due to 
opportunities for moral hazard, adverse selection and other opportunistic behaviour of 
management will be increased (Aboody & Lev, 2000; Holland, 2006). Therefore, governance 
mechanisms might act to reduce agency cost by enhancing voluntary disclosure of IC 
information (Ramadan & Majdalany, 2013). 
A combination of several governance mechanisms can be considered better for reducing 
the agency cost and protecting the interests of shareholders because of the effectiveness of 
corporate governance being achieved via different channels (Cai et al., 2008) and a particular 
mechanism’s effectiveness depends on the effectiveness of others (Davis & Useem, 2002; 
